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Abstract
Given the enormous consequences that the diagnosis of vegetative state (VS)
vs. minimally conscious state (MCS) may have for the treatment of patients with
disorders of consciousness, it is particularly important to empirically legitimate the
distinction between these two discrete levels of consciousness. Therefore, the
aim of this contribution is to review all the articles reporting statistical evidence
concerning the performance of patients in VS vs. patients in MCS, on behavioral
or neurophysiological measures. Twenty-three articles matched these inclusion
criteria, and comprised behavioral, electroencephalographic (EEG), positron
emission tomography (PET) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) measures.
The analysis of these articles yielded 47 different statistical findings. More than
half of these findings (n = 24) did not reveal any statistically significant difference
between VS and MCS. Overall, there was no combination of variables that
allowed reliably discriminating between...
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Given the enormous consequences that the diagnosis of vegetative state (VS) vs.
minimally conscious state (MCS) may have for the treatment of patients with disorders
of consciousness, it is particularly important to empirically legitimate the distinction
between these two discrete levels of consciousness. Therefore, the aim of this
contribution is to review all the articles reporting statistical evidence concerning the
performance of patients in VS vs. patients in MCS, on behavioral or neurophysiological
measures. Twenty-three articles matched these inclusion criteria, and comprised
behavioral, electroencephalographic (EEG), positron emission tomography (PET) and
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) measures. The analysis of these articles yielded 47
different statistical findings. More than half of these findings (n = 24) did not reveal
any statistically significant difference between VS and MCS. Overall, there was no
combination of variables that allowed reliably discriminating between VS and MCS. This
pattern of results casts doubt on the empirical validity of the distinction between VS and
MCS.
Keywords: minimally conscious state, vegetative state, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, consciousness, brain
injury
INTRODUCTION
The vegetative state (VS; Jennett and Plum, 1972), in the past
called apallic syndrome (Kretschmer, 1940; Gerstenbrand, 1977),
and more recently defined as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
(UWS; Laureys et al., 2010), is a clinical condition that often
follows coma, in which the patient appears to be wakeful, with
cycles of eye closure and opening resembling those of sleep and
waking, but with no signs of awareness, defined in terms of
“purposeful or voluntary responses” (Working Group of Royal
College of Physicians, 1996; Giacino, 1997; Jennett, 2002). As the
diagnosis of VS is entirely based on negative evidence, namely
the lack of “purposeful and voluntary responses” (Wade and
Johnston, 1999; Kotchoubey et al., 2005), it leads to a high rate of
errors (Childs et al., 1993; Andrews et al., 1996; Wijdicks, 2006).
Some severely brain-damaged patients occasionally present
weak and inconsistent “purposeful or voluntary responses”. These
patients have been defined as in minimally conscious state (MCS),
and their limited but definite behaviors are considered evidence of
self or environmental awareness (American Congress for Rehabil-
itation Medicine, 1995; Giacino et al., 2002). Hence, the clinical
differentiation between VS and MCS is based on the subtle
distinction, based on the evaluator’s interpretation, between pur-
poseless and involuntary behaviors in VS, and purposeful and
voluntary behaviors in MCS (Kotchoubey et al., 2005).
In 2002, as a consequence of the lack of data to establish
evidence-based guidelines for the diagnosis, prognosis, and man-
agement of the MCS, the Aspen Workgroup (Giacino et al.,
2002) formulated a consensus-based case definition using behav-
iorally referenced diagnostic criteria. According to these crite-
ria, MCS should be clearly discernible from VS on the basis
of specific behavioral features, such as the ability to follow
simple commands, gestural or verbal responses, and purpose-
ful behavior not due to reflexive activity (e.g., responses to
questions, reaching for objects, touching or holding objects
while accommodating their size and shape, eye movements
or sustained fixation in direct response to salient stimuli,
etc.).
Several diagnostic tools are commonly used for the diag-
nosis of patients with disorders of consciousness (Schnakers,
2012). The Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale and Jennett,
1974) was the first validated scale for the assessment of level of
consciousness, and measures arousal level, motor function, and
verbal abilities (Schnakers, 2012). The Disability Rating Scale
(DRS; Rappaport et al., 1982) was developed to rate the effects
of traumatic brain injury, to track the patient’s rehabilitation
progress, and to estimate how long recovery might take. The
JFK Coma Recovery Scale (CRS; Giacino et al., 1991), also in
its revised form (CRS-R; Giacino et al., 2004), is one of the
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most frequently used scales, which addresses auditory, visual,
oromotor, communication and arousal functions, arranged hier-
archically from simple reflexive activity to complex cognitively-
mediated behaviors. Other assessment scales include the Full
Outline of UnResponsiveness scale (FOUR; Wijdicks et al., 2005),
the Wessex Head Injury Matrix (WHIM; Shiel et al., 2000), and
the Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilitation Technique
(SMART; Gill-Thwaites, 1997).
Albeit the variety of diagnostic tools, the discrimination
between VS and MCS remains quite challenging, and the line of
demarcation between the two conditions is still not clear-cut. In
fact, the misdiagnosis between the two populations appears to be
common, and has recently received considerable attention from
the media (Hopkin, 2006; Wijdicks, 2006), given its enormous
implications in prognosis and treatment. As observed by Gill-
Thwaites (2006), several factors render the differential diagnosis
of VS and MCS difficult, including the expertise of the evaluators,
and the variability in the patients’ medical and physical man-
agement. Moreover, the movements of brain-damaged patients
can be very limited, inconsistent, and easily exhausted (Gosseries
et al., 2011), and are strongly influenced by the fluctuations of
the patients’ conditions (Majerus et al., 2005; Schnakers et al.,
2009).
With the present review article, we question the empirical
validity of the distinction between VS and MCS. In order to
shed light on whether this dichotomy is legitimate, we analyzed
research articles reporting statistical evidence of the different
behavioral and neurophysiological performances of patients with
a VS and a MCS diagnosis.
METHODS
To review all studies directly comparing behavioral and neuro-
physiological responses in MCS and VS patients, we used the
Keywords: “VS” and “MCS” on PubMed, limiting the search to
title and/or abstract. In addition, given the multiple denomina-
tions of the VS, a similar search was also performed using the
Keywords: “UWS” and “MCS” (leading to only one additional
reference), and the keywords “apallic syndrome” and “MCS”
(with no additional results). These initial searches led to 262
results. We afterwards selected the articles based on our aims. To
be included in the review, the articles had to be published on
peer-reviewed journals in English, and had to present a direct
statistical comparison of behavioral and/or neurophysiological
responses in patients in MCS and VS. This led us to discard
a large number of studies involving both groups of patients,
which however did not report a direct statistical comparison
between the two groups, e.g., due to a limited sample of sub-
jects. A total of 23 research articles were finally included in the
review, for a total of 47 distinct experiments. Each experiment
was analyzed in terms of the type of experimental assessment
and the type of stimulation. We divided the different studies
in four macro-categories: (1) Stimulus-independent physiologi-
cal and neurophysiological assessments; (2) Stimulus-dependent
behavioral assessments; (3) Stimulus-dependent neurophysio-
logical assessments (using sensory stimuli); and (4) Stimulus-
dependent neurophysiological assessments (using meaningful
stimuli). These macro-categories, further divided according to
the type of stimulation used, are described in the following
paragraphs.
Tables 1–4 summarize the different assessments, diagnostic
tools, numbers of subjects, type of measurement, and main
outcomes concerning MCS/VS differentiation, for each macro-
category.
STIMULUS-INDEPENDENT PHYSIOLOGICAL AND
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS
RESTING STATE MEASUREMENTS
In order to overcome possible negative results due to assessments
that imply the patients’ speech compliance and comprehension,
considerable effort has been taken in the last years to find diag-
nostic indicators that are independent of task demands (Lechinger
et al., 2013). Resting-state electroencephalography (EEG) quali-
fies as a relatively easy method that can be applied at bedside,
and a high level of EEG complexity (i.e., variability) seems to
be a good predictor of functional outcome (Fingelkurts et al.,
2011).
Coleman et al. (2005) used simultaneous EEG and positron
emission tomography (PET) to assess the integrity of the homeo-
static coupling relationship between neuronal electrical function
and cerebral metabolism, in patients with a VS (n = 6) and a
MCS (n = 4) diagnosis. The coupling between neuronal elec-
trical activity and regional glucose metabolism appeared to be
preserved in all patients in MCS, but was absent in patients in
VS. Whereas the VS group showed a higher degree of EEG slow
wave activity compared to the MCS group, the regional cerebral
metabolic rate, however, did not vary significantly between the
two patient groups.
Lehembre et al. (2012) analyzed the differences in power
spectra and connectivity in the resting state EEG of patients with
a VS (n = 10) and a MCS (n = 18) diagnosis. In the delta band,
relative power spectra were higher in the VS group compared to
the MCS group. Conversely, in the alpha band, relative power
spectra were higher in the MCS group compared to the VS
group. These findings suggest a slowing of brain electrical activity
in the patients with a VS diagnosis. Connectivity assessments
based on classical coherence did not differentiate between the two
diagnostic groups for any of the frequency bands. To diminish
the influence of common sources due to volume conduction, the
phase lag index (PLI) and the imaginary part of coherence (IC)
were also computed (for more in-depth explanations of these
indices, refer to the works of Nolte et al., 2004). The PLI and IC
indicated a higher frontal-to-posterior connectivity in the theta
band in the MCS group compared to the VS group. Importantly,
as observed by the authors, these results were only obtained
at the group level, so that further work would be required in
the direction of disentangling VS and MCS at the individual
level.
Differently from Coleman et al. (2005) and from Lehembre
et al. (2012), Lechinger et al. (2013) did not find significant
differences for any of the frequency bands in the EEG resting
state of patients with a VS (n = 8) and a MCS (n = 9) diagno-
sis. Nevertheless, frequency ratios, and especially the alpha/theta
ratio, appeared to be good predictors for CRS-R scores, as slower
brain activity was associated to lower function. From this study,
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Table 1 | Stimulus-independent physiological and neurophysiological assessments.
Study Number of subjects Diagnostic criteria Type of assessment Difference between
VS and MCS
VS MCS
Bonfiglio et al. (2013) 4 5 CRS-R EEG resting state n.s.
Bonfiglio et al. (2014) 4 5 CRS-R EEG resting state Lower alpha (p < 0.01) and beta
(p < 0.05) band power in VS compared
to MCS
Coleman et al. (2005) 6 4 RCP; Giacino et al.
(2002)
PET resting state n.s.
Coleman et al. (2005) 6 4 RCP; Giacino et al.
(2002)
EEG resting state Higher degree of slow wave activity in
VS (p < 0.05)
Cruse et al. (2013) 18 37 CRS-R Actigraphy sleep
assessment
Weaker circadian rhythms in VS
(p < 0.01)
de Biase et al. (2014) 27 5 CRS-R EEG sleep assessment Simultaneous presence of sleep ele-
ments less frequent in VS (p < 0.001);
REM sleep less frequent in VS
(p < 0.001)
Fernández-Espejo et al. (2011) 10 15 M-STFR (1994); Giacino
et al. (2002)
DTI resting state Higher decrease in mean diffusivity in
VS (p < 0.006)
Lechinger et al. (2013) 8 9 CRS-R EEG resting state n.s.
Lehembre et al. (2012) 10 18 CRS-R EEG resting state Higher power in delta band and lower
power in alpha band in VS (p < 0.05);
higher connectivity in MCS (p < 0.05)
Schnakers et al. (2008) 13 30 CRS-R, GCS EEG resting state Lower BIS in VS compared to MCS
(p < 0.001)
Wu et al. (2011b) 21 16 M-STFR (1994); Giacino
et al. (2002)
EEG resting state n.s.
Wu et al. (2011a) 20 30 M-STFR; Giacino et al.
(2002)
EEG resting state C-ApEn indices significantly lower in
VS (p < 0.001)
Abbreviation legend: VS = vegetative state; MCS = minimally conscious state; DTI = diffusion tension imaging; CRS-R = Coma Recovery Scale – Revised; RCP = Royal
College of Physicians; M-STFR = Multi-Society Task Force Report; GCS = Glasgow Coma Scale; EEG = electroencephalography; PET = positron emission tomography;
BIS = bispectral index; C-ApEn = cross-approximate entropy; n.s. = not significant.
Table 2 | Stimulus-dependent behavioral assessments.
Study Number of subjects Diagnostic criteria Type of assessment Stimuli Difference betweenVS and MCS
VS MCS
Trojano et al. (2012) 9 9 CRS-R Visual pursuit Moving target n.s difference in duration of fixations;
Lower proportion of fixations in VS
patients (p < 0.001).
Abbreviation legend: VS = vegetative state; MCS = minimally conscious state; CRS-R = Coma Recovery Scale – Revised; n.s. = not significant.
it could be concluded that although EEG frequency ratios may
not be able to univocally discriminate between VS and MCS,
they could indeed represent a good predictor of residual cognitive
functioning.
In recent years, Bonfiglio et al. (2009) observed a bioelectrical
oscillatory activity in the delta frequency range, which was both
time-locked and phase-locked to the spontaneous blinking at
rest. This activation, defined as blink-related delta oscillations
(delta BROs), has been associated to a mechanism comparing
the current environment image, appearing at the eyelid opening,
with its mnestic representation at the moment of eyelid clo-
sure. Bonfiglio et al. (2013) hypothesized a relationship between
the conscious state of a subject and his/her blinking behavior,
interpreted as a signature of the automatic monitoring of the
surrounding environment. Hence, they assessed whether BROs
could allow discriminating between patients in VS (n = 4) and
in MCS (n = 5) during resting state. In fact, delta BROs were
absent or significantly reduced in both groups of patients com-
pared to healthy individuals, and could not reliably differentiate
between VS and MCS. Interestingly, a direct relationship between
quantitative aspects of delta BROs and the Levels of Cognitive
Functioning Scale (LCFS) was found. This result is consistent with
the findings of Lechinger et al. (2013), showing that although
resting state activation may not reliably discriminate between
diagnostic categories, it indeed correlates with levels of cognitive
functioning.
In a follow-up study on the same patients, Bonfiglio et al.
(2014) found that alpha and beta bands were characterized by
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Table 3 | Stimulus-dependent neurophysiological assessments: processing of sensory stimuli.
Study Number of subjects Diagnostic Type of Stimuli Difference between
criteria assessment VS and MCS
VS MCS
Boly et al. (2004) 15 5 M-STFR (1994);
Giacino et al.
(2002)
PET Auditory (clicks) n.s difference in BAEPs;
Lower functional connectiv-
ity in VS (p <0.05)
Boly et al. (2008) 5 15 M-STFR (1994);
Giacino et al.
(2002)
PET Somatosensory (electrical
nociceptive)
Greater activation in “pain
matrix” areas for MCS
(p < 0.05)
Cavinato et al. (2011) 11 6 DRS EEG Auditory (oddball tones) n.s.
de Biase et al. (2014) 27 5 CRS-R EEG Visual (flash) n.s.
de Biase et al. (2014) 27 5 CRS-R EEG Somatosensory (electrical) n.s.
de Biase et al. (2014) 27 5 CRS-R EEG Auditory n.s.
Fischer et al. (2010) 16 11 CRS-R EEG Somatosensory (electrical) n.s.
Fischer et al. (2010) 16 11 CRS-R EEG Auditory (oddball tones) n.s difference in BAEPs;
Pa component significantly
more absent or reduced in
VS (p <0.05)
King et al. (2013) 75 68 CRS-R EEG Auditory (tones) Higher mutual information in
MCS (p <0.0001)
Kotchoubey et al. (2005) 50 48 DRS EEG Auditory (simple tones) N1 and P2 more frequent in
MCS (p <0.05)
Kotchoubey et al. (2005) 50 48 DRS EEG Auditory (simple tones
oddball)
N1 and P2 more frequent in
MCS (p <0.05)
Kotchoubey et al. (2005) 50 48 DRS EEG Auditory (complex tones
oddball)
N1 and P2 more frequent in
MCS (p <0.05)
Kotchoubey et al. (2005) 50 48 DRS EEG Auditory (natural sounds) N1 and P2 more frequent in
MCS (p <0.05)
Kotchoubey et al. (2005) 50 48 DRS EEG Auditory (complex tones,
MMN paradigm)
n.s.
Kotchoubey et al. (2005) 50 48 DRS EEG Auditory (simple tones,
MMN paradigm)
n.s.
Ragazzoni et al. (2013) 8 5 M-STFR (1994);
Giacino et al.
(2002)
EEG Somatosensory (electrical) n.s.
Ragazzoni et al. (2013) 8 5 M-STFR (1994);
Giacino et al.
(2002)
EEG TMS Absence of contralateral
TEPs more frequent in VS
patients (p <0.015)
Wu et al. (2011b) 21 16 M-STFR (1994);
Giacino et al.
(2002)
EEG Somatosensory (electrical
nociceptive)
n.s.
Wu et al. (2011a) 20 30 M-STFR (1994);
Giacino et al.
(2002)
EEG Somatosensory (electrical
nociceptive)
C-ApEn indices significantly
lower in VS (p <0.001)
Abbreviation legend: VS = vegetative state; MCS = minimally conscious state; n.s. = not significant; CRS-R = Coma Recovery Scale – Revised; M-STFR = Multi-
Society Task Force Report; DRS = Disability Rating Scale; EEG = electroencephalography; PET = positron emission tomography; TMS = transcranial magnetic
stimulation; BAEPs = brainstem auditory evoked potentials; C-ApEn = cross-approximate entropy.
higher power in the MCS group compared to the VS group. For
the interpretation of this finding, it is important to consider that
three of the five subjects with a MCS diagnosis actually presented
a higher LCFS score (<4) than what is considered typical for this
diagnostic category, therefore showing relatively high cognitive
functioning (MCS+).
In search of an objective measurement tool for achieving a
more accurate assessment of patients in disorders of conscious-
ness, Schnakers et al. (2008) computed the bispectral index
(BIS) in patients with a VS (n = 13) and a MCS (n = 30)
diagnosis who underwent an EEG resting-state measurement.
The BIS, originally designed to measure the depth of anes-
thesia and sedation, is empirically derived from three resting
state EEG parameters, namely (1) the ratio of the power in
the beta ranges; (2) the ratio of the bicoherence in fast and
slower frequencies provided by bispectral analysis; and (3) the
burst suppression ratio. This index, normalized on a scale from
0 (no arousal) to 100 (patient fully aroused), was significantly
lower in patients in VS (63/100) compared to patients in MCS
(80/100). This result was in line with a positive correlation
between the BIS and the consciousness scores obtained with the
CRS-R.
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Table 4 | Stimulus-dependent neurophysiological assessments: processing of meaningful stimuli.
Study Number of subjects Diagnostic Type of Stimuli Difference between
criteria assessment VS and MCS
VS MCS
Cavinato et al.
(2011)
11 6 DRS EEG SON (oddball with tones) n.s.
Cavinato et al.
(2011)
11 6 DRS EEG SON (oddball with other
names)
n.s.
Fellinger et al.
(2011)
13 8 CRS-R EEG SON (oddball with other
names), passive listening
n.s.
Fellinger et al.
(2011)
13 8 CRS-R EEG SON (oddball with other
names), attention to SON
n.s.
Fellinger et al.
(2011)
13 8 CRS-R EEG SON (oddball with other
names), attention to another
name
n.s.
Fischer et al.
(2010)
16 11 CRS-R EEG SON (oddball with tones) n.s.
Kotchoubey et al.
(2005)
50 48 DRS EEG Semantic (word categories) n.s.
Kotchoubey et al.
(2005)
50 48 DRS EEG Semantic (word pairs) n.s.
Kotchoubey et al.
(2005)
50 48 DRS EEG Semantic (sentences) n.s.
Kotchoubey et al.
(2013)
6 6 CRS-R fMRI Pain cries Higher weighted global con-
nectivity in MCS (p <0.05)
Kotchoubey et al.
(2014)
29 26 CRS-R fMRI Semantic (sentences) n.s.
Perrin et al. (2006) 5 6 CRS-R EEG SON n.s.
Wu et al. (2011b) 21 16 M-STFR (1994); Giacino
et al. (2002)
EEG Music n.s.
Wu et al. (2011a) 20 30 M-STFR (1994); Giacino
et al. (2002)
EEG Music C-ApEn indices significantly
lower in VS (p <0.001)
Wu et al. (2011a) 20 30 M-STFR (1994); Giacino
et al. (2002)
EEG Semantic (words) C-ApEn indices significantly
lower in VS (p <0.001)
Abbreviation legend: VS = vegetative state; MCS = minimally conscious state; DRS = Disability Rating Scale; CRS-R = Coma Recovery Scale – Revised; M-STFR =
Multi-Society Task Force Report; EEG = electroencephalography; fMRI = functional magnetic resonance; SON = subject’s own name; C-ApEn = cross-approximate
entropy; n.s. = not significant.
During the past years, nonlinear dynamic analyses (NDA) have
become a common way to study neural mechanisms, allowing
the investigation of informative correlations such as the degree of
synchronization within local networks, and the coupling between
distant cortical networks (Wu et al., 2011a). Wu et al. (2011a)
applied NDA on EEG resting state data collected in patients with
VS (n = 21) and MCS (n = 16) diagnosis, using three nonlinear
indices: (i) Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZC), which quantifies the
complexity of time series, and has also been used for characteriz-
ing the depth of anesthesia (Zhang et al., 2001); (ii) Approximate
entropy (ApEn), which quantifies the irregularity of data time
series and is usually used for assessing whether the subject is
awake (e.g., high levels of entropy during anesthesia demon-
strate that the subject is awake, whereas low levels of entropy
indicate unconsciousness); (iii) Cross-approximate entropy (C-
ApEn), which measures the degree of dissimilarity between two
concurrent series, allowing to uncover subtle disruptions in
network dynamics. Although both patients in VS and in MCS
showed significantly lower nonlinear indices compared to healthy
controls, these indices did not allow differentiating VS and MCS.
In a follow-up study on a larger sample of subjects (VS = 20,
MCS = 30), the same group (Wu et al., 2011b) reported that the
interconnection of local and distant cortical networks, measured
with the C-ApEn index, was higher in the MCS group compared
to the VS group.
Recently, diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) has been used to
assess white matter integrity in patients with disorders of con-
sciousness (Voss et al., 2006; Perlbarg et al., 2009; Tollard et al.,
2009). Fernández-Espejo et al. (2011) used this technique to
compare patients with a VS (n = 10) and MCS (n = 15) diagnosis.
Significant abnormalities were observed in the integrity of the
tissue in subcortical, thalamic and brainstem regions in both
groups of patients. Compared to the MCS group, the VS group
showed a significant decrease in the mean diffusivity (MD) of the
subcortical white matter and of the thalamus, but not of the MD
of the brainstem.
In sum, whereas some resting state assessments seem to
be indeed able to differentiate between the VS and the
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MCS conditions, others evidently fail to do so. Nevertheless,
a correlation between brain activity and behavioral assess-
ments (on which the VS and MCS diagnoses are based)
is generally present. This could indicate that although evi-
dent behavior can be a good predictor of brain activation, it
might not always allow differentiating patients in two clear-cut
categories.
ASSESSMENT OF SLEEP
The assessment of sleep could represent a useful stimulus-
independent measure of a person’s level of consciousness. The
presence of normal sleep in patients with a VS diagnosis, how-
ever, is still a matter of debate. For instance, Landsness et al.
(2011) observed that patients with a VS diagnosis did not
show typical sleep-related EEG patterns. Nevertheless, accord-
ing to the Multi-Society Task Force for Permanent Vegetative
State (PVS, 1994) and the Royal College of Physicians (Royal
College of Physicians, 2003), wakefulness, i.e., the presence of
typically cycling periods of eye-closure and eye-opening resem-
bling sleep cycles, is preserved in both patients in VS and in
MCS.
Cruse et al. (2013) assessed circadian sleep-wake rhythms in
patients in VS (n = 18) and MCS (n = 37) during four days, using
a wrist-mounted actigraphy device to measure the frequency and
amplitude of motor activity. No significant effect of diagnosis
was found on the proportion of patients exhibiting circadian
rhythms, which were present in 83% of patients in VS and 84%
of patients in MCS. Circadian rhythms, however, appeared to
be weaker in VS relative to MCS, and motor activity positively
correlated with the behavioral scores obtained with the CRS-R.
What is particularly interesting in this study is that a significant
proportion of patients, either with a VS or an MCS diagnosis,
did not exhibit statistically reliable circadian sleep-wake rhythms,
which, by definition, should be preserved in these diagnostic
categories.
de Biase et al. (2014) assessed EEG sleep patterns during
24 h on patients diagnosed as in VS (n = 27) and as in
MCS (n = 5). More specifically, the authors investigated the
presence of a sleep-wake cycle, sleep spindles, rapid eye move-
ment (REM), and K-complexes (i.e., indicators of non-REM
sleep). All sleep elements were present at least once during
the measurement in all patients in MCS, but only in 7.4% of
patients in VS. This difference was significant, especially con-
cerning the presence of REM sleep (100% in MCS and 14.8%
in VS). In general, subjects showing all sleep elements had sig-
nificantly higher CRS-R scores compared to those lacking some
elements.
Although only two studies included a statistical comparison
concerning sleep in patients with VS and MCS diagnoses, it
appears that the differences between the two groups are not
always marked, as in the study by Cruse et al. (2013). Nev-
ertheless, these studies have in common a correlation between
behavioral scores and sleep elements. Hence, although more
studies comparing sleep in the two patient groups are required,
it may be concluded that ordinal behavioral scores, rather
than categories, could be more useful in predicting sleep
elements.
STIMULUS-DEPENDENT BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENTS:
VISUAL PURSUIT
All guidelines for the diagnoses of disorders of consciousness
consider visual tracking as an important marker for differenti-
ating VS and MCS (Giacino et al., 2002; Majerus et al., 2005;
Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2008; Schnakers et al., 2009; Trojano
et al., 2012). Whereas fixation of a stationary visual target is
considered compatible with the diagnosis of VS (PVS, 1994;
Royal College of Physicians, 2003; Bruno et al., 2010), the visual
pursuit of moving stimuli is considered sufficient for the diag-
nosis of MCS (Giacino et al., 2002, 2004; Majerus et al., 2005;
Schnakers et al., 2009). Assuming whether a patient’s behav-
ior is volitional or reflexive, however, strongly depends on the
examiner and on the different assessment tools. In order to
obtain a more objective measure, Trojano et al. (2012) used
an eye-tracker to quantify visual responses to moving stimuli
in patients diagnosed as in VS (n = 9) and in MCS (n = 9).
Participants were asked to keep their eyes on a moving target
as much as possible throughout trials. The mean duration of
single fixations, considered to be related to information pro-
cessing, did not differ in the two diagnostic categories. The
proportion of on- or off-target fixations was higher in patients
in MCS, compared to patients in VS. It is nevertheless important
to point out that the proportion of fixations was notably low
in both groups of patients. Interestingly, two patients with a
MCS diagnosis showed a fixation distribution that did not differ
significantly from chance level, therefore conflicting with their
diagnosis.
To our knowledge, this is the only behavioral assessment pre-
senting a direct statistical comparison between the performance
of patients with a VS and a MCS diagnosis. Albeit some difference
between the two groups could be found, the very low proportion
of fixations for the MCS group questions the validity of their
diagnosis.
STIMULUS-DEPENDENT NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENTS: PROCESSING OF SENSORY STIMULI
In the last years, electrophysiological and neuroimaging assess-
ments have been developed to accompany the behavioral evalu-
ation of disorder of consciousness. Many of these measurements
are based on the “hierarchic complexity hypothesis” (Kotchoubey,
2002; Kotchoubey et al., 2005), according to which the ability to
process physically simple stimulus qualities (e.g., sounds) is a pre-
requisite for the processing of more complex stimuli (e.g., word
meanings). Hence, according to this hypothesis, the presence of
middle latency event-related potential (ERP) components (e.g.,
the N1 and the mismatch negativity (MMN)), which are related
to the activity of the sensory cortex, should be a prerequisite
for the presence of later components (e.g., the P300), reflecting
the activity of associate cortical areas, which are therefore related
to more complex processes. The validation of this hypothesis is
particularly important, as its rationale is generally used in the
diagnosis of disorders of consciousness. In fact, if a patient does
not show early responses, the assessment is usually interrupted,
such that the investigation of later responses related to more
complex processing is not investigated. In the last years, several
neurophysiological studies using different kinds of stimuli have
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been performed, and provide us with useful information about
the hierarchic hypothesis.
AUDITORY AND VISUAL STIMULATION
Boly’s research group (Boly et al., 2004) used O-radiolabeled
PET to investigate the differences in cortico-cortical functional
connectivity between patients with a VS (n = 15) and a MCS
(n = 5) diagnosis, while stimulated with simple auditory clicks.
The groups did not differ relatively to brainstem auditory evoked
potentials (BAEP). In the MCS group, auditory stimulation acti-
vated the auditory cortex bilaterally, mostly in the transverse and
superior temporal gyri (TTG, STG). The VS group presented a
very similar activation pattern in the bilateral auditory cortex,
although less widespread. Functional connectivity between the
secondary auditory cortex and posterior temporal and prefrontal
areas, considered to be involved in higher levels of auditory
processing, was significantly tighter in patients in MCS compared
to patients in VS. Boly et al. (2004) interpreted this finding as
an evidence of the differences in attentional state and conscious
perception between the two groups.
Fischer et al. (2010) used an auditory oddball paradigm in
patients diagnosed as in VS (n = 16) and in MCS (n = 11).
Similarly as in the study by Boly et al. (2004), BAEPs did not differ
between the two groups. The Pa component of middle latency
auditory evoked potentials (MLAEPs), however, was significantly
more absent or reduced in the VS group compared to the MCS
group, and N1 abolition was significantly more common in the
VS group. The MMN did not differ between the two groups.
Consistently with Boly et al. (2004) and with Fischer et al. (2010),
de Biase et al. (2014) also did not find significant differences
in the BAEPs of patients with VS (n = 27) and MCS (n = 5)
diagnosis.
Kotchoubey et al. (2005) investigated how frequently ERP
responses to auditory stimuli could be found in a large sample
of patients in VS (n = 50) and in MCS (n = 48), with several
different oddball and MMN paradigms. The EEG responses to
the different kinds of stimuli were estimated as a function of
complexity level of cortical processing. More precisely, the aim
was to verify the hierarchic complexity hypothesis, according to
which the processing of complex stimuli is always subtended to
the processing of more simple stimuli. Participants were divided
into two main groups (MG1, MG2) and two control groups (CG1,
CG2). MG1 (n = 38) comprised patients with a VS diagnosis,
with dominant theta or slow alpha EEG activity, not suppressed
by light. MG2 (n = 38) comprised patients with a MCS diag-
nosis with a dominant theta background activity. CG1 (n = 12)
comprised patients clinically and neuropsychologically identical
those in MG1, but characterized by a more pathological rest EEG,
with either large diffuse delta waves, a flat EEG, or alternation
of delta activity and paroxysmal discharges. CG2 (n = 10) com-
prised patients who were similar to those in MG2, but whose
EEG was characterized by either fast theta or slow alpha oscilla-
tions, which were suppressed by light. Three oddball paradigms
were used, i.e., one with simple sine tones, one with complex
tones (harmonic chords), and one with natural sounds (vowels).
Moreover, two MMN paradigms were used, one with simple
tones and the other with complex tones. These five paradigms
were designed to assess three levels of cortical processes, namely
auditory cortical responses (P1, N1, and P2), the MMN (as a
sign of primary differentiation outside the focus of attention),
and the P3 (indicating a deeper level of differentiation). No
significant difference was found between the two main groups for
the P1, N1, P2, and P3 components. MG1 and MG2 only differed
significantly in the frequency of MMN, as unexpectedly, the MG1
characterized by a more severe diagnosis (i.e., VS), exhibited
better MMN results. The differences with the respective control
groups were more substantial, as both N1 and MMN responses
were less frequent in CG1 than in MG1. CG2 presented more
frequent P3 responses compared to MG2. Importantly, when
compared regardless of their background activity, patients in VS
and in MCS only differed significantly relative to early cortical
responses (N1 and P2), which were more frequent in the MCS
group.
The study of Kotchoubey et al. (2005) is particularly inter-
esting, as the inspection of individual data showed that the
hierarchical hypothesis is not universally confirmed. In fact,
the N1-P2 complex did not reach significance in some patients
who indeed presented a significant P3. Hence, the assertion
that the processing of simple stimuli would be easier than that
of physically complex stimuli was rebutted. Moreover, more
complex responses were present above chance level not only
in patients with a MCS diagnosis, but also in the ones with
a VS diagnosis. The P3 and P600 components were found in
a greater than chance percentage of patients in VS, suggesting
activity in association cortical areas. These unexpected responses
could be related to a modular structure of cortical informa-
tion processing, in which encapsulated modules are suggested
to exist and work, while disconnected from other modules,
therefore leading to “islands’ of awareness in severely damaged
patients.
The results obtained by Kotchoubey et al. (2005) are in dis-
agreement with those of Boly et al. (2004), who reported tighter
functional connectivity in patients in MCS, suggesting higher
levels of auditory processing in these patients. Nevertheless, it
should be observed that Boly et al. (2004) did not divide their
samples into subgroups according to their background EEG activ-
ity. In the study by Kotchoubey et al. (2005), across all patients
in VS, ERPs were slightly less than those for patients in MCS
but these differences disappeared when patients with a similar
EEG pattern were compared, indicating that background EEG
should be controlled for when assessing functions in disorders of
consciousness.
Cavinato et al. (2011) performed an oddball paradigm with
sine tones on patients with a VS (n = 11) and a MCS (n = 6)
diagnosis. Participants were instructed to count the deviant
tones. No significant differences were found between groups
concerning ERP amplitude and latency. Importantly, more than
half of the patients in VS presented a reliable P3 compo-
nent, indicating a spared modular cognitive ability to discrimi-
nate between simple sounds, or some fluctuation of awareness,
despite the complete lack of externally observable behaviors. The
authors suggested that the higher chance, compared to previ-
ous studies, of recording long-latency responses in patients in
VS could have been affected by the use of salient stimuli, as
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well as by an active condition in which subjects were explic-
itly asked to keep a mental count of the number of target
stimuli.
King et al. (2013) assessed global information sharing across
brain areas in patients VS (n = 75) and in MCS (n = 68),
who performed an EEG auditory paradigm for clinical purposes
(listening to four identical tones). The authors introduced an
index, the “weighted symbolic mutual information” (wSMI),
namely the estimate of the amount of information shared by
two EEG signals. The VS group presented a significantly lower
wSMI than the MCS group. Such difference appeared to be
particularly prominent across centroposterior areas, compatibly
with theories associating consciousness with recurrent loops in
posterior networks (Lamme, 2010).
The only comparison relative to visual evoked potentials
(VEPs) was performed by de Biase et al. (2014), who used
flash stimuli with patients with a VS (n = 27) and a MCS
(n = 5) diagnosis. VEPs were not significantly different in the two
groups.
These findings indicate that a differentiation between the VS
and MCS categories on the basis of the processing of auditory
and visual stimuli is not always possible (Kotchoubey et al., 2005;
Cavinato et al., 2011; de Biase et al., 2014). Moreover, clear-cut
differentiations between the two groups are complicated by the
violation of the hierarchic hypothesis (Kotchoubey et al., 2005),
such that patients with a VS diagnosis who do not present early
EEG responses may indeed exhibit higher-latency responses rela-
tive to more complex processing, possibly due to spared modular
cognitive abilities. Interestingly, asking participants to perform an
active task (Cavinato et al., 2011) instead of passively perceiving
the stimuli may decrease the possibility of differentiating between
the two categories.
SOMATOSENSORY, NOCICEPTIVE, AND TRANSCRANIAL MAGNETIC
STIMULATION
Boly et al. (2008) investigated nociception in patients in VS (n= 5)
and in MCS (n = 15) following electrical stimulation, using PET.
In the MCS group, the thalamus, the primary (S1) and secondary
(S2) somatosensory cortices, the insula, the frontoparietal cor-
tex, and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) were significantly
more activated than in the VS group. These areas, belonging
to the so-called “pain matrix”, have been recently associated to
the ability to detect, orient attention towards, and react to the
occurrence of salient sensory events (Iannetti and Mouraux, 2010;
Legrain et al., 2011; Mouraux et al., 2011). Compared to the
VS group, the MCS group showed a higher functional connec-
tivity between the S1 and the lateral and medial frontotemporal
areas.
Fischer et al. (2010) measured somatosensory evoked poten-
tials (SEPs) in patients in VS (n = 16) and in MCS (n = 11), by
electrically stimulating the median nerve. The abolition or the
delay of the N20-P24 complex of SEPs was more frequent in the
VS group than in the MCS group.
Ragazzoni et al. (2013) also measured SEPs elicited through
electrical stimulation of the median nerve in patients with a VS
(n = 8) and a MCS (n = 5) diagnosis. In contrast with Fischer et al.
(2010), no significant difference emerged between the two patient
groups concerning the N20 and N1 peaks. The EEG frequency
power spectra also did not discriminate significantly between
MCS and VS, in none of the frequency bands. With a similar
experiment, de Biase et al. (2014) reported that SEPs in patients
diagnosed as in VS (n = 27) and as in MCS (n = 5) during
median nerve stimulation could not differentiate between the two
groups.
Wu et al. (2011b) measured non-linear indices (LZC, ApEn,
and C-ApEn, described previously in paragraph Stimulus-
Independent Physiological and Neurophysiological Assessments)
in the EEG of patients in VS (n = 21) and in MCS (n = 16)
who underwent nociceptive acupuncture electrical stimulation.
None of the indices differed significantly between the two patient
groups. In a similar study performed by the same team on a
different sample, however, the C-ApEn index was significantly
lower in the VS group (Wu et al., 2011a).
With the same groups of subjects who underwent
electrical stimulation, Ragazzoni et al. (2013) applied
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the scalp
overlaying the primary motor cortex (M1) of the less affected
hemisphere. Contralateral TMS-evoked potentials (TEPs)
were significantly more absent in the VS compared to the
MCS group, whereas no significant difference in the absence
of ipsilateral TEPs emerged. As noted by the authors, TEPs
and ERPs explore different aspects of brain function, i.e.,
TEPs directly assess basic properties of intra- and inter-
hemispheric circuitries, whereas ERPs involve the activation
of associative cortices and are specifically linked to cognitive
processes.
Similarly to what emerged from resting state studies, sleep
assessments, and investigations using auditory and visual stim-
ulation, brain responses to somatosensory and nociceptive stim-
ulation may allow discriminating between VS and MCS in some
cases (Boly et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2011b), but
not in the totality of the assessments (Wu et al., 2011a; Ragazzoni
et al., 2013; de Biase et al., 2014).
STIMULUS-DEPENDENT NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENTS: PROCESSING OF MEANINGFUL STIMULI
AFFECTIVE STIMULATION AND MUSIC
Few studies have been performed using non-verbal stimuli, which
may however be meaningful for the subjects, such as human
vocalizations or music (Wu et al., 2011b; Kotchoubey et al.,
2013). For instance, Kotchoubey et al. (2013) compared fMRI
connectivity in patients with a VS (n = 6) and a MCS (n = 6)
diagnosis, who were presented with an emotional empathy task,
namely listening to emotional cries of pain and suffering. The
stimuli were drawn from the International Affective Digitized
Sounds (IADS) database, and had been rated by healthy individu-
als as highly emotional. No significant difference in task-related
activation was found between the two patient groups. Global
functional connectivity, however, was significantly higher in the
MCS group compared to the VS group, particularly in clusters
that have been associated to empathy, such as the insula, the ACC,
and the cerebellum.
Wu et al. (2011b) compared non-linear dynamic EEG indices
in patients in VS (n = 21) and in MCS (n = 16), who received
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musical stimulation, and reported no significant differences
between the two groups in the LZC, ApEn, and C-ApEn indices.
In another study from the same team (2011b), the C-ApEn
index was able to discriminate between the two patient groups
(VS = 20, MCS = 30), as it was significantly higher in the MCS
group.
Given the limited number of studies assessing the processing
of non-verbal meaningful stimuli, which appear to be effective
in differentiating levels of consciousness, further investigations
should be carried out in this direction.
SEMANTIC STIMULI
Understanding spoken language is a complex ability. Firstly, lis-
teners must analyze the acoustic properties of speech, to identify
individual linguistic units. Secondly, they have to retrieve the
stored representations of word meanings from memory. Finally,
such representations should be adequately combined to build
a representation of the whole sentence’s meaning (McClelland
and Elman, 1986). Consistently with the hierarchical hypothesis,
results from functional neuroimaging studies in healthy volun-
teers support the idea of processing streams radiating from pri-
mary auditory regions with low-level acoustic processes located
in and around the auditory cortex, whereas higher level linguistic
processes involved in computing meanings are located further
away from primary auditory regions, in temporal and frontal
regions (Belin et al., 2000; Binder et al., 2000; Scott et al., 2000;
Davis and Johnsrude, 2003; Scott and Johnsrude, 2003; Rodd
et al., 2005).
Kotchoubey et al. (2005) tested the hierarchic hypothesis rela-
tively to language comprehension using three semantic oddball
paradigms (with word categories, word pairs, and sentences),
with the same sample of patients as in the auditory experiments
described in paragraph Somatosensory, Nociceptive, and Tran-
scranial Magnetic Stimulation (VS = 50, MCS = 48), divided into
four groups according to their background EEG activity (MG1
= 38, MG2 = 38, CG1 = 12, CG2 = 10). Semantic responses
were never found in patients in CG1, namely patients with a VS
diagnosis and an abnormal EEG background activity. Concerning
the main groups of patients in VS and in MCS, no significant
difference was found in the percentage of patients showing N400
responses. Moreover, in contrast to the hierarchical hypothesis,
some patients who had not shown a significant oddball P3 or
a MMN, presented indeed a significant N400. In fact, cortical
evidence for semantic differentiation was found in around 25%
of the patients with a VS diagnosis. Importantly, Kotchoubey
et al. (2005) pointed out that the processing capacities of these
patients could have been underestimated, and that the ERP data
might have been biased toward false negatives, mainly for two
reasons: firstly, several factors such as habituation, fluctuations
in arousal, and fatigue increase the probability of missing an
ERP component (Neumann and Kotchoubey, 2004); secondly,
an ERP component could be lacking due to a focal lesion to
its cortical generator, irrespectively of the state of consciousness.
The hierarchy violations in this study may be partly explained by
possible fluctuations of patients’ arousal, such that some exper-
iments may have been performed in more “favorable” periods
than others. Another possible explanation is that the responses
could be related to a modular structure of cortical information
processing, in which individual encapsulated cortical modules
work independently from other modules.
In a recent fMRI study, Kotchoubey et al. (2014) presented
patients with a VS (n = 29) and a MCS (n = 26) diagno-
sis with short sentences, half of which were factually correct,
and the other half factually incorrect. Differential activation
for false and true sentences was found in 38% of the patients
with a VS diagnosis, and for 19% of the patients with a
MCS diagnosis, in language-related regions including Broca and
Wernicke areas. Hence, in a considerable number of patients,
responses closely resembled the ones of healthy individuals,
albeit weaker. The difference between the two diagnostic groups,
however, was not significant, consistently with the previous
results obtained by the same research group (Kotchoubey et al.,
2005).
Differently from Kotchoubey et al. (2005, 2014), who could
not differentiate between semantic-related EEG responses in
patients in VS and in MCS, Wu et al. (2011b) found that when
presenting commonly used words to patients with a VS (n = 20)
and a MCS diagnosis (n = 30), the C-ApEn non-linear index
was significantly higher in the MCS group compared to the VS
group.
Similarly to neurophysiological studies using simple sensory
stimulation, experiments in which verbal stimuli are used also
show that the VS and MCS categories are not always discriminated
reliably, even when the considered samples are relatively large,
and multiple assessments are performed (Kotchoubey et al., 2005,
2014). These experiments also represent further evidence of the
fact that the hierarchic hypothesis can be violated. The compu-
tation of non-linear indices (Wu et al., 2011b), although still not
widespread, may represent a useful strategy for assessing levels of
consciousness, and could therefore become a useful integration of
the assessment of ERPs.
Subject’s own name
A particular kind of semantic stimulus that is frequently used
in the assessment of consciousness is the subject’s own name
(SON). The SON is a word that is processed since infancy, and
being self-referential, is considered to be more salient (Fellinger
et al., 2011) and emotionally charged (Perrin et al., 2006) than
other words. Moreover, compared to other stimuli, the SON has
been reported to elicit enhanced cortical activity (Cavinato et al.,
2011).
Perrin et al. (2006) investigated the detection of the SON,
compared to other seven equiprobable first names (OFNs), in
patients in VS (n = 5), and in patients in MCS (n = 6), as well
as in patients in locked-in states (LIS, n = 4). A P3 compo-
nent was observed in all patients in MCS and in LIS, and in
three of the five patients in VS. The P3 amplitude was always
significantly higher in response to one’s own name compared
to other first names. However, this response did not allow
differentiating VS from MCS. Interestingly, this was the first
study that showed that a differential P3 component could be
recorded in response to the SON, not only in patients with a
diagnosis of MCS, but also in some patients diagnosed as in
VS.
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Fischer et al. (2010) performed an oddball paradigm in which
the SON represented the deviant stimulus within a series of
simple tones, with patients in VS (n = 16) and in MCS (n = 11).
Consistently with Perrin et al. (2006), this task did not allow
differentiating the two groups of patients, also because the novelty
P3 component was absent in more than two thirds of the sub-
jects, regardless their diagnosis. Similarly, Cavinato et al. (2011)
used two SON oddball paradigms with patients diagnosed as
in VS (n = 11) and in MCS (n = 6). In the first paradigm,
the name of the participant was a deviant stimulus within a
series of tone bursts. In the second paradigm, the SON was
a deviant and three other first names were used as control
stimuli. Participants were asked to count the number of times
they heard their own name. No significant group effects for the
ERP amplitude and latencies emerged from either experiment.
Importantly, P3 responses were detected in more than half of
the patients in VS. The high proportion of patients showing a
response to saliency, despite the lack of observable behavior, could
be explained by the fact that they were required to perform an
active task.
Fellinger et al. (2011) used a selective attention paradigm in
which three different conditions were used. In the first condition,
patients in VS (n = 8) and in MCS (n = 13) had to passively
listen to a list of first names, also comprising the SON. In
the two active conditions, the participants were asked to either
count the number of occurrences of the SON, or to count the
occurrence of another specified name. In general, no significant
differences were observed in the two groups of patients, as both
groups exhibited a stronger theta-synchronization to their own
names when forced to count them, and a delay in theta power
in response to targets relative to non-targets when participants
were instructed to count their own name. The only difference
between the VS and the MCS groups was the time-point in which
they reached the maximal increase in theta power for targets as
compared to non-targets, since patients in VS exhibited a higher
time jitter. In this study, both groups of patients showed to be
capable of neuronally responding to their own name with an
increase in theta activation, which was not present when they
were asked to attend to other names or during passive listen-
ing. According to these results, and in agreement with Cavinato
et al. (2011), both groups of patients were able to respond to
the instruction of attending their own name, therefore using
their working memory and performing some kind of top-down
processing task.
These results represent a further confirmation of the fact
that differentiating VS and MCS according to the patients’ brain
responses is not at all straightforward, even when a salient, self-
referential and emotionally-charged stimulus such as one’s own
name is used as input.
DISCUSSION
Our literature review indicates that out of 47 measurements,
24 failed to reveal any significant statistical difference between
behavioral or neurophysiological responses of patients with a VS
and a MCS diagnosis. This is a considerable number, which might
possibly be underestimated by a bias concerning the publication
of negative results (Dickersin and Min, 1993; Jennings and Van
Horn, 2012; Dwan et al., 2013; Kicinski, 2013). In fact, Dickersin
(1990, 1997; Dickersin et al., 1992) estimated that statistically
significant results are three times more likely to be published
than null results. Although there is currently no available data
on publication bias towards positive results specifically in the
field of disorders of consciousness, such bias has been reported
in adjacent medical fields, e.g., in the dissemination of clinical
trial results (Dickersin and Min, 1993; van Lent et al., 2014).
According to a recent survey performed by Malicˇki and Marusic´
(2014), 36% of researchers reported unpublished trials due to a
publication bias, and 30% admitted selective outcome reporting
depending on their results. Moreover, research without statis-
tically significant results takes longer time to gain publication
than research with significant results (Stern and Simes, 1997;
Ioannidis, 1998; Decullier et al., 2005; Scherer et al., 2007). An
investigation on the publication of biomedical research protocols
performed by Decullier et al. (2005) showed a highly signif-
icant difference (p < 0.001) in the time of publication from
the date of committee approval, dependent on study outcomes
(5.2 years for confirmatory results, 6.9 years for invalidating
results, and 6.5 for inconclusive results). These results suggest
that there could be more studies not showing statistical difference
between VS and MCS, which have not been reported in the
literature.
The studies described in this review involved different num-
bers of subjects, ranging from measurements comprising a
total of nine patients, to studies with almost one hundred
patients. Notwithstanding, no correlation emerged between the
number of patients involved in the studies and the lack of
significant differences between diagnostic groups (r = 0.12,
p = 0.41).
The different experiments were performed on patients
diagnosed in Italy (12 measurements), Germany (11 measure-
ments), United Kingdom (3 measurements), Belgium (6 measure-
ments), France (4 measurements), Austria (4 measurements), and
China (7 measurements). Interestingly, the proportion of non-
significant results markedly differed between countries (Italy:
67%, Germany: 55%, United Kingdom: 33%, Belgium: 17%,
France: 50%, Austria: 100%, China: 43%), possibly indicating
high variability in the application of standardized diagnostic
criteria across countries. The interpretation of these percentages,
however, is complicated not only by the difference in the number
of studies, but mostly by the fact that multiple measurements
were sometimes performed by the same research group, as in the
case of the studies performed in Germany (Kotchoubey et al.,
2005, 2013, 2014), often presenting non-significant differences
between diagnostic groups, and in Belgium (Boly et al., 2004,
2008; Perrin et al., 2006; Schnakers et al., 2008; Lehembre et al.,
2012; Cruse et al., 2013), where on the contrary, such differences
generally emerged. Measurements in Italy, on the other hand,
were performed by four independent research groups (Cavinato
et al., 2011; Trojano et al., 2012; Bonfiglio et al., 2013, 2014;
Ragazzoni et al., 2013; de Biase et al., 2014), and the occurrence
of non-significant differences was common in all the groups, with
only one exception (Trojano et al., 2012). A possible interpreta-
tion of these data could rely on the variability of the diagnoses
across different hospitals and research groups. Nevertheless, it is
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not possible to exclude that the dissemination of negative results
might be more encouraged in some laboratories compared to
others.
Interestingly, a high percentage of non-significant differences
between VS and MCS emerged from studies using meaning-
ful stimuli, such as verbal stimuli and the SON, in which a
markedly higher performance of patients with a MCS diagnosis
was expected. It is important to note that, in several cases,
patients’ behavioral or physiological responses contradicted their
diagnosis, and therefore their assignment to either the VS or
the MCS category. For instance, Cruse et al. (2013) did not
find, in several patients, reliable circadian sleep-wake rhythms,
which should be preserved in both VS and MCS by definition.
Trojano et al. (2012) reported that fixation behavior, expected
in both VS and MCS, was lacking in several patients. In some
cases, patients with a VS diagnosis showed stronger electrophys-
iological responses than patients with a MCS diagnosis (i.e.,
for the MMN response), which also suggested the processing
of complex stimuli characteristics (Kotchoubey et al., 2005). In
particular, in the experiments performed by Kotchoubey et al.
(2005), background EEG activity was more predictive of stimulus-
related brain responses than clinical diagnosis. The results by
Cavinato et al. (2011) indicate that not only patients with a MCS
diagnosis, but also those with a VS diagnosis may be able to
perform active tasks, therefore exhibiting purposeful behavior.
P3 responses, generally considered to be absent in patients in
VS, were nevertheless obtained in patients with a VS diagnosis
in several assessments (Kotchoubey et al., 2005; Perrin et al.,
2006).
A first interpretation of these findings could be that they
derive from a high rate of misdiagnoses, so that many patients
classified as in VS may actually be in a MCS condition, or vice
versa. Misdiagnoses could be due to multiple reasons, such as
the fluctuations of the patients’ arousal and conditions, fatigue,
variations in medical and physical management, and inexperience
of the evaluators (Neumann and Kotchoubey, 2004; Majerus et al.,
2005; Gill-Thwaites, 2006; Schnakers et al., 2009; Gosseries et al.,
2011). Nevertheless, the diagnoses of disorders of consciousness
are generally performed on the basis of behavioral measures such
as the CRS-R, which generally correlate with the presence of
behavioral responses/electrophysiological activations (Schnakers
et al., 2008; Bonfiglio et al., 2009, 2014; Lechinger et al., 2013;
de Biase et al., 2014), even when these responses and activations
are not predicted by clinical diagnosis (Bonfiglio et al., 2009;
Lechinger et al., 2013). This observation inevitably questions
the usefulness of using the VS and MCS dichotomic diagnostic
categories, instead of relying on ordinal behavioral scores, which
appear to have a stronger relationship with the patients’ responses.
This is also in agreement with a recent multi-center observational
study (Sattin et al., 2014), according to which patients in VS
and in MCS often present more similarities than differences, and
that interventions and long-term health care programs should be
carried out mainly according to the descriptions of the patients’
functioning. It should also be considered that, in some cases,
patients included in the MCS category have higher cognitive
functioning scores compared to what would be considered normal
for their diagnosis (Bonfiglio et al., 2014), although this might
not be always indicated in research reports. In fact, some of the
investigations which appear to discriminate between VS and MCS
categories may be rather discriminating between groups with very
different levels of cognitive functioning. Further complications
derive from the use of different diagnostic criteria, also within the
same study.
The violation of the hierarchic hypothesis in several measure-
ments (Kotchoubey et al., 2005) indicates that the assessment of
consciousness is not at all straightforward, and that individuals
who appear to be unresponsive at the behavioral or at the elec-
trophysiological level could indeed exhibit “islands” of awareness.
These results are consistent with other reports showing that the
processing of simple stimuli is not necessarily easier than that
of more complex stimuli (Rauschecker, 1997; Tervaniemi et al.,
2000; Hall et al., 2002), and that partially functional cerebral
regions may be preserved even in brains with extremely severe
injury (Schiff et al., 2002; Coleman et al., 2007). Hence, it is
absolutely insufficient to declare a patient as “cortically non-
responsive” when obtaining a negative result, as the same patient
could exhibit significant responses in more demanding and com-
plex tasks. These findings introduce the necessity of assessing
patients on multiple aspects (i.e., behavioral responses, electro-
physiological responses to simple sensory stimuli, electrophysi-
ological responses to complex meaningful stimuli, etc.), which
might lead to independent outcomes. Recently, Casali et al. (2013)
introduced a promising non-invasive diagnostic approach based
on the computation of the perturbational complexity index (PCI),
which reflects the information content of the brain’s response
to TMS (also found to be useful for the evaluation of levels of
consciousness by Ragazzoni et al., 2013). The PCI appears to be
correlated with the level of consciousness of healthy individuals
during wakefulness, dreaming, non-REM sleep, and anesthesia,
as well as of patients who emerged from coma, and could
therefore be used as an integration of other neurophysiological
measures.
The systematic use of multiple behavioral and neurophysio-
logical assessment procedures could also be complemented by
learning assessment strategies. Signs of learning, defined as a
process by which a person acquires knowledge on the relationship
between responses and environmental events (Bosco et al., 2009),
might represent a basic level of non-reflective consciousness
(Bosco et al., 2009, 2010). To this end, Bekinschtein et al. (2009)
demonstrated that some patients diagnosed as in VS are able
to learn associations between stimuli, and concluded that these
individuals might have a partially preserved conscious processing,
which cannot be detected by standard behavioral assessments.
Lancioni et al. (2007, 2008a,b,c, 2009a,b) assessed learning in
people with disorders of consciousness using a non-verbal pro-
cedure, technically supported by microswitches detecting simple
responses (e.g., minimal forehead wrinkling, eye-blinking, slight
movements, etc.) and electronic control systems providing the
person with contingent feedback to these responses. These assess-
ments also have the advantage of being less dependent on sub-
jectivity compared to naked-eye examinations, while being less
invasive than neurophysiological assessments. Moreover, learn-
ing procedures may also have the benefit of overcoming the
extinction of goal-directed thinking in individuals with disorders
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of consciousness, allowing the performance of tasks that could
facilitate the interaction of the patients with their environment
(Liberati and Birbaumer, 2012).
The pertinence of placing a dividing line between VS and
MCS was also recently debated by Nettleton et al. (2014), who
introduced the concept of “diagnostic illusory”, which stresses the
ambiguity and tensions deriving from the biomedical imperative
to classify patients with disorders of consciousness in discrete and
rigid categories. Diversified assessment procedures would allow
developing a multifaceted evaluation, instead of a dichotomic
categorization.
CONCLUSIONS
From the analysis of several measures comparing VS and MCS,
both at the behavioral and at the neurophysiological level, it
emerges that there is no combination of variables which reliably
and consistently allows discriminating between these two diag-
nostic categories. This pattern of results questions the empirical
validity of the distinction between VS and MCS. We therefore
suggest to overcome the use of a strict and clear-cut distinc-
tion between the two categories, and recommend the use of
diversified assessment procedures (i.e., investigating behavioral
responses, brain activation, learning process, etc.) in order to
develop a multifaceted evaluation of patients with disorders of
consciousness.
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